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As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain,
and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. It seems to me
that complete clarity [...] first became common property through that trend
in mathematics known as “axiomatics”. The progress achieved by axiomatics
consists in its having neatly separated the logical-formal from its objective or
intuitive content; according to axiomatics, the logical-formal alone forms the
subject matter of mathematics, which is not concerned with the intuitive or
other content associated with the logical formal.
Albert Einstein, from “Geometry and Experience”, a lecture given on January
27, 1921.
To admit singularities does not seem to me the right way. I think that
in order to make real progress we must once again find a general principle
conforming more truly to nature.
Albert Einstein, from a letter to H. Weyl, June 6, 1922.
WHAT IS ONTOLOGY?
Ontology is the more general class of theories about the world. It is more basic than any
specific science because it is not concerned with individual entities and their interactions
but with very general features of all existents. Ontology deals with questions such as
‘what is a law of nature?’ ‘what are properties?’ ‘what are events?’ ‘what categories
of being there are, if any?’ ‘what is space?’ ‘what is time?’ ‘is the world determined?’
and so on. According to Bunge’s Dictionary, ontology is “the branch of philosophy that
studies the most pervasive features of reality [...]. Ontology does not study constructs,
i.e. ideas in themselves.” [1].
Ontology, then, is what once was called “metaphysics”. This name has fallen in
disgrace, especially among physicist, since the strong attacks by logical positivists in
the first half of the twenty century. ‘Metaphysics’ is sometimes reserved to the great and
comprehensive philosophical systems created by Aristotle, Kant, Leibniz, etc. In the
past few decades, nonetheless, metaphysics has become respectable once again, among
philosophers at least. Sometimes, the name general ontology is used for metaphysics,
and “ontology” is restricted to the narrow sense adopted by Quine and others in the late
1940s [2].
In the latter sense, ontology is understood as the class of entities accepted by a given
theory. It is said that if we accept a theory as true, then we are committed to accept the
existence of those entities that are truth-makers of the theory. In Quine’s parlance the
ontology is the range of the bound variables of a theory. In other words, the ontology
is the reference class of the theory. The ontology of biology is the collection of living
beings. The ontology of ancient atomism, the collection of all atoms, i.e. indivisible
entities. Although all this may seem trivial, when we look at some contemporary and
highly formalized theories of physics, the answer to the questions “what is the asso-
ciated ontology?” can be far from obvious. A classic example is Quantum Mechanics.
What is Quantum Mechanics about? Particles? Waves? Observers? Instruments? Fields?
Probabilities? Minds? Infinite worlds? Quantons? Any physics aficionado knows that the
discussions on the particular are never-ending. Without a formal analysis of the founda-
tions of the theory it is very difficult to settle the issue. It is an amazing fact that we can
make extraordinary accurate predictions without knowing what we are talking about.
In this article I intend to discuss the ontology of General Relativity. Although this
theory is not considered as problematic as Quantum Mechanics, a quick overview of the
literature shows that the mere analysis of the natural language used to present the theory
is plagued with ambiguities. Is the theory about space-time? Or is it about clocks and
rods? Or fields? Or gravitating objects? What about singularities? It is occasionally said
that there are theorems in the theory that imply the existence of space-time singularities.
Is this correct? In what follows I want to dispel some of the conceptual fog that covers
these issues.
LANGUAGE, REPRESENTATION, AND REALITY
The most basic assumption of science is that there is a reality to be known. Without the
postulate of the independent existence of a real world the scientific enterprise would be
vain. I shall not discuss this primary assumption here. Rather, I want to focus on how we
represent the world in our attempts to understand it1.
In order to build representations of some features of the world we use conceptual
systems called languages. In ordinary life natural languages such as English, German or
Spanish are, or seem to be, enough for most purposes. If we want to penetrate deeper
into the structure of reality, however, we need formal languages as those provided by
logic and mathematics.
A formal language is a system of signs with a set of explicit rules to generate
valid combinations of symbols (see, for instance, the treatises by Bunge [3], [4] and
Martin [5]). These rules give instructions (syntactic rules) about how valid arrangements
of symbols (called formulas) are formed, or relate symbols and formulas with extra-
linguistic objects (semantic rules). The operation of deduction allows to obtain valid
formulas from valid formulas. If a set of formulas is closed under deduction, we call it
a theory. Any interpreted2 theory, with the help of auxiliary conditions, should produce
statements about states of affairs that occur in the world. If a state of affairs can be used
to validate a statement and this statement satisfies truth conditions3 in the theory, we say
that the theory (actually one of its models) represents some aspect of the world.
The use of formal languages in science brings many advantages, to the point that those
specific disciplines that do not make intensive use of formal methods are generally un-
derdeveloped. Clarity and precision are gained through formalization. This results in a
significant reduction of the vagueness that is inherent to natural languages. The extensive
use of formalized languages, besides, enables us to elicit in a systematic way the conse-
quences of our assumptions. The adoption of the special class of formalized languages
of mathematics makes possible to introduce quantitative and complex representations of
properties and changes that we detect in the world.
A basic assumption of factual science is that a property can be represented by some
mathematical function. Reality is not mathematical, but certainly our more accurate
representations of it are. Physical systems, in general, are described by models where
properties and processes are represented by mathematical constructs. Models, in this
way, are representations of the mechanisms that we assume occur in physical systems.
This is so to the extent that to explain a thing is to unveil the mechanisms that operate in
it, i.e. to faithfully represent the manifold of physical processes with a coherent system
of mathematical functions and constructs [7].
Sometimes, in highly elaborated theories, however, formalization can reach such a
degree of complexity that the semantics of the language might be difficult to elucidate.
This results in problems of interpretation and is a source of confusion.
1 By “the world” I understand the totality of existents.
2
‘Interpreted’ in this context means ‘endowed with semantic rules’.
3 See ref. [6] on formal truth.
THE STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL THEORIES
When a theory becomes too complex, axiomatization provides a way of clarification,
making all assumptions and definitions explicit. Since every theory is expressed in some
language, it can be arranged as a system of statements and definitions. More exactly a
theory T is a set of statements s closed under the operation of logical implication (→):
any s ∈ T is either an axiom (basic statement) or a consequence of the set of axioms A
(T = {s : A → s}).
The axioms can be grouped in three subsets: mathematical axioms, physical axioms,
and semantic axioms [8]. The first group states the basic formal structure of the theory.
For instance, in a field theory mathematical axioms introduce a set with a given topology
and some additional structure (e.g. metric) that allows to define a mathematical space.
The semantical axioms relate the mathematical structures with physical entities. These
axioms equip the theory with an interpretation. This interpretation and the meanings of
the different terms are propagated from the axioms (with the help of adequate definitions
that allow for economy of language) to the theorems or derived statements. A formal
theory of semantics must be applied to determine the flow of meaning from the basis A
to any s ∈ T .
Finally, the physical axioms express relations among constructs that represent physi-
cal entities. These relations are usually presented in the form of differential or integro-
differential equations that represent physical laws, i.e. objective patterns in the world4.
If a given function represents a physical property of a material system, then physical
axioms (equations) provide constraints to the state space accessible to the system. The
physical axioms are the core of the theory.
In addition to its formal, semantic, and physical structure, any theory has some
background knowledge that is assumed. This background is a set of formal theories
(e.g. topology and differential geometry), physical theories (e.g. electromagnetism) and
purely ontological theories (e.g. space-time, in the case of General Relativity). We turn
now to the latter theory, fundamental for the understanding of gravitation.
WHAT IS SPACE-TIME?
General Relativity is said sometimes to be a “a theory of space and time”. We read,
for instance, in the classic textbook by Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler [9]: “Space acts
on matter, telling it how to move. In turn, matter reacts back on space, telling it how
to curve"’. The concept of space-time, however, is presupposed by all classical field
theories. The concept was introduced by Minkowski [10], and belongs to ontology, not
to physics [11]. A formal construction of space-time can be obtained starting from an
ontological basis of either things [12], [13] or events [14]. In what follows I provide
4 Some physicists claim that “laws are expressed by functionals” but this is utterly wrong. Functionals
are constructs that can be used to obtain laws through some general principles, such as the Principle of
Minimal Action. Functionals do not express laws by themselves. For example, a Lagrangian does not
represent a law for a field, the law is obtained through the Lagrange equations.
a simple outline of an ontological theory of space-time. Let us begin defining space-time.
Space-time is the emergent of the ontological composition of all events.
Events can be considered as primitives or can be derived from things as changes
in their properties if things are taken as ontologically prior. Both representations are
equivalent since things can be construed as bundles of events [14]. Since composition
is not a formal operation but an ontological one5, space-time is neither a concept nor
an abstraction, but an emergent entity. As any entity, space-time can be represented
by a concept. The usual representation of space-time is given by a 4-dimensional real
manifold E equipped with a metric field gab:
ST=ˆ〈E,gab〉 .
I insist: space-time is not a manifold (i.e. a mathematical construct) but the “totality”
of all events. A specific model of space-time requires the specification of the source
of the metric field. This is done through another field, called the “energy-momentum”
tensor field Tab. Hence, a model of space-time is:
MST = 〈E,gab,Tab〉 .
The relation between both tensor fields is given by field equations. The metric field
specifies the geometry of space-time. The energy-momentum field represents the poten-
tial of change (i.e. event generation) in space-time.
We can summarize all this in the following axioms.
P1−Syntactic. The set E is a C∞ differentiable, 4-dimensional, real pseudo-
Riemannian manifold.
P2−Syntactic. The metric structure of E is given by a tensor field of rank 2, gab, in
such a way that the differential distance ds between two events is:
ds2 = gabdxadxb.
P3−Syntactic. The tangent space of E at any point is Minkowskian, i.e. its metric is
given by a symmetric tensor ηab of rank 2 and trace −2.
P4−Syntactic. The metric of E is determined by a rank 2 tensor field Tab through the
following field equations:
Gab −gabΛ = κTab, (1)
where Gab is the Einstein tensor (a function of the second derivatives of the metric).
Both Λ and κ are constants.
5 For instance, a human body is composed by cells, but is not just a mere collection of cells since it has
emergent properties and specific functions far more complex than those of the individual components.
P5−Semantic. The elements of E represent physical events.
P6−Semantic. Space-time is represented by an ordered pair 〈E, gab〉:
ST=ˆ〈E,gab〉 .
P7−Semantic. There is a non-geometrical field represented by a 2-rank tensor field
Tab on the manifold E.
P8−Semantic. A specific model of space-time is given by:
MST = 〈E,gab,Tab〉 .
Notice that so far no mention has been done of the gravitational field. The sketched
theory is purely ontological, and hence, cannot be identified yet with General Relativity.
THE GRAVITATIONAL FIELD AND SPACE-TIME
The ontological theory of space-time is not a theory of the gravitational field. It is a
theory presupposed by all theories of physics. Any representation of dynamical pro-
cesses takes place ‘in’ space-time, i.e. it is parametrized in terms of space-time variables.
In order to describe gravitation through a space-time theory, additional semantic rules
are necessary. These rules will link space-time concepts with gravitational concepts. In
words of Hans Reichenbach “It is not the theory of gravitation that becomes geome-
try, but it is geometry that becomes an expression of the gravitational field” [15]. Some
mathematical (geometric) objects of the space-time formalism represent some aspect of
the gravitational field. But, what object represents the gravitational field?
The Einstein tensor is:
Gab ≡ Rab − 12Rgab, (2)
where Rab is the Ricci tensor formed from second derivatives of the metric and R ≡
gabRab is the Ricci scalar. The geodetic equations for a test particle free in the gravita-
tional field is:
d2xa
dλ 2 +Γ
a
bc
dxb
dλ
dxc
dλ , (3)
with λ an affine parameter and Γabc the affine connection, given by:
Γabc =
1
2
gad(∂bgcd +∂cgbd −∂dgbc). (4)
The affine connection is not a tensor, but can be used to build a tensor that is di-
rectly associated with the curvature of space-time: the Riemann tensor. The form of the
Riemann tensor for an affine-connected manifold can be obtained through a coordinate
transformation xa → x¯a that makes the affine connection vanish everywhere, i.e.
¯Γabc(x¯) = 0, ∀ x¯, a, b, c. (5)
The coordinate system x¯a exists if
Γabd,c −Γabc,d +Γaec Γebd −Γade Γebc = 0 (6)
for the affine connection Γabc(x). The left hand side of Eq. (6) is the Riemann tensor:
Rabcd = Γ
a
bd,c−Γabc,d +Γaec Γebd −Γade Γebc. (7)
When Rabcd = 0 the metric is flat, since its derivatives are zero. If K = RabcdRbcda > 0
the metric has a positive curvature. Sometimes is said that the Riemann tensor represents
the gravitational field, since it only vanishes in the absence of fields. On the contrary, the
affine connection can be set locally to zero by a transformation of coordinates. This fact,
however, only reflects the equivalence principle: the gravitational field can be suppressed
in any locally free falling system. Wording differently, the tangent space to the manifold
that represents space-time is always Minkowskian. To determine the mathematical ob-
ject of the theory that represents the gravitational field we have to consider the weak
field limit of Eqs. (1). When this is done we find that that the gravitational potential
is identified by the metric coefficient g00 ≈ η00 + h00 and the coupling constant κ is
−8πG/c4. If the metric represents the gravitational potential, then the affine connection
represents the strength of the field itself. This is similar to what happens in electrody-
namics, where the 4-vector Aμ represents the electromagnetic potential and the tensor
field Fμν = ∂μAν − ∂νAμ represents the strength electromagnetic field. The Riemann
tensor, by other hand, being formed by derivatives of the affine connection, represents
the rate of change, both in space and time, of the strength of the gravitational field [16].
The source of the gravitational field in Eqs. (1), the tensor field Tab, represents also
physical properties of material things. It represents the energy and momentum of all
non-gravitational systems.
The class of reference of General Relativity is then formed by all gravitational fields
and all physical systems that generate such fields. This means that, since all material
objects have energy and momentum, the reference class of the theory is maximal: it
includes everything. This, of course, does not imply that the theory provides a correct
description of any physical system in the universe, as we shall see. Moreover, we shall
argue in what follows that the theory is necessarily incomplete.
ARE THERE SINGULARITIES?
Singularities are features of some solutions of Eqs. (1). Hence, they appear in some
models MST of space-time. Several authors have inferred from this that singularities
should exist in the world, i.e. that they are part of the ontology of General Relativity. I
disagree.
A space-time model is said to be singular if its manifold E is incomplete. A manifold
is incomplete if it contains at least one inextendible curve. A curve γ : [0,a) −→ E is
inextendible if there is no point p in E such that γ(s) −→ p as a −→ s, i.e. γ has no
endpoint in E. It is said that a given space-time model 〈E, gab〉 has an extension if there
is an isometric embedding θ : M −→ E ′, where 〈E ′,g′ab〉 is another space-time model
and θ is an application onto a proper subset of E ′. Essential singular space-time models
do not admit regular extensions; they essentially contains at least one curve γ that is
inextendible in the sense given above. The singular character of the solution cannot be
avoided just finding an adequate coordinate system.
Singular space-times are said to contain singularities, but this is an abuse of language:
singularities are not ‘things’ in space-time, but a pathological feature of some solutions
of the fundamental equations of the theory.
An essential or true singularity should not be interpreted as a representation of a
physical object of infinite density, infinite pressure, etc. Since the singularity does not
belong to the manifold that represents space-time in General Relativity, it simply cannot
be described or represented in the framework of such a theory. General Relativity is
incomplete in the sense that it cannot provide a full description of the gravitational
behavior of any physical system [17]. True singularities are not within the range of
values of the bound variables of the theory: they do not belong to the ontology of a
world that can be described with 4-dimensional differential manifolds.
Several singularity theorems can be proved from pure geometrical properties of the
space-time model [18], [19]. The most important of these theorems is due to Hawking
& Penrose [20]:
Theorem. Let 〈E, gab〉 be a time-oriented space-time satisfying the following condi-
tions:
1. RabV aV b ≥ 0 for any non space-like V a.
2. Time-like and null generic conditions are fulfilled.
3. There are no closed time-like curves.
4. At least one of the following conditions holds
• a. There exists a compact6 achronal set7 without edge.
• b. There exists a trapped surface.
• c. There is a p ∈ E such that the expansion of the future (or past) directed null
geodesics through p becomes negative along each of the geodesics.
Then, 〈E, gab〉 contains at least one incomplete time-like or null geodesic.
If the theorem has to be applied to the physical world, the hypothesis must be sup-
ported by empirical evidence. Condition 1 will be satisfied if the energy-momentum Tab
satisfies the so-called strong energy condition: TabV aV b ≥ −(1/2)T aa , for any time-like
vector V a. If the energy-momentum is diagonal and corresponds to an ideal fluid, the
strong energy condition can be written as ρ +3p ≥ 0 and ρ + p ≥ 0, with ρ the energy
density and p the pressure. Condition 2 requires that any time-like or null geodesic expe-
6 A space is said to be compact if whenever one takes an infinite number of "steps" in the space, eventually
one must get arbitrarily close to some other point of the space. For a more formal definition, see below.
7 A set of points in a space-time with no two points of the set having time-like separation.
riences a tidal force at some point in its history. Condition 4a requires that, at least at one
time, the universe is closed and the compact slice that corresponds to such a time is not
intersected more than once by a future directed time-like curve. The trapped surfaces
mentioned in 4b refer to horizons due to gravitational collapse. Condition 4c requires
that the universe is collapsing in the past or the future.
The theorem is purely geometric, no physical law is invoked. Theorems of this type
are a consequence of the gravitational focusing of congruences. A congruence is a
family of curves such that exactly one, and only one, time-like geodesic trajectory passes
through each point p ∈ E. If the curves are smooth, a congruence defines a smooth time-
like vector field on the space-time model. If V a is the time-like tangent vector to the
congruence, we can write the spatial part of the metric tensor as:
hab = gab +VaVb. (8)
For a given congruence of time-like geodesic we can define the expansion, shear, and
vorticity tensors as:
θab = V(i;l)hiahlb, (9)
σab = θab − 13habθ , (10)
ωab = hiahlbV[i;l]. (11)
Here, the volume expansion θ is defined as:
θ = θabhab = ∇aV a =V a;a. (12)
The rate of change of the volume expansion as the time-like geodesic curves in the
congruence are moved along is given by the Raychaudhuri [21] equation:
dθ
dτ =−RabV
aV b− 13θ
2 −σabσab +ωabωab,
or
dθ
dτ =−RabV
aV b − 13θ
2−2σ2 +2ω2. (13)
We can use now the Einstein field equations (without Λ) to relate the congruence with
the space-time curvature:
RabV aV b = κ
[
TabV aV b +
1
2
T
]
. (14)
The term TabV aV b represents the energy density measured by a tie-like observer with
unit tangent four-velocity V a. The weak energy condition then states that:
TabV aV b ≥ 0. (15)
The strong condition is:
TabV aV b +
1
2
T ≥ 0. (16)
Notice that this condition implies, according to Eq. (14),
RabV aV b ≥ 0. (17)
We see, then, that the conditions of the Hawking-Penrose theorem imply that the
focusing of the congruence yields:
dθ
dτ ≤−
θ2
3 , (18)
where we have used that both the shear and the rotation vanishes. Equation (18) indicates
that the volume expansion of the congruence must necessarily decrease along the time-
like geodesic. Integrating, we get:
1
θ ≥
1
θ0
+
τ
3 , (19)
where θ0 is the initial value of the expansion. Then, θ → −∞ in a finite proper time
τ ≤ 3/ |θ0|. This means that once a convergence occurs in a congruence of time-like
geodesics, a caustic (singularity) must develop in the space-time model. The non space-
like geodesics are in such a case inextendible.
Singularity theorems are not theorems that imply the physical existence, under some
conditions, of space-time singularities. Material existence cannot be formally implied.
Existence theorems imply that under certain assumptions there are functions that satisfy
a given equation, or that some concepts can be formed in accordance with some explicit
syntactic rules. Theorems of this kind state the possibilities of some formal system or
language. The conclusion of the theorems, although not obvious in many occasions, is
always a necessary consequence of the assumptions made.
In the case of singularity theorems of classical field theories like General Relativity,
what is implied is that under some assumptions the solutions of the equations of the
theory are defective beyond repair. The correct interpretation of these theorems is that
they point out the incompleteness of the theory: there are statements that cannot be made
within the theory. In this sense (and only in this sense), the theorems are like Gödel’s
famous theorems of mathematical logic8.
To interpret the singularity theorems as theorems about the existence of certain space-
time models is wrong. Using elementary second order logic is trivial to show that there
cannot be non-predicable objects (singularities) in the theory [23]. If there were a non-
predicable object in the theory,
8 Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limita-
tions of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic. The first theorem states that
any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent
and complete [22].
(∃x)E (∀P)∼ Px, (20)
where the quantification over properties in unrestricted. The existential quantification
(∃x)E , on the other hand, means
(∃x)E ≡ (∃x)∧ (x ∈ E) .
Let us call P1 the property ‘x ∈ E’. Then, formula (20) reads:
(∃x) (∀P)(∼ Px ∧P1x), (21)
which is a contradiction, i.e. it is false for any value of x.
We conclude that there are no singularities nor singular space-times. There is just a
theory with a restricted range of applicability.
THE CONTINUUM APPROXIMATION AND ITS BREAKDOWN
The existence of singular solutions in a background-independent9 theory such as General
Relativity is a consequence of some contradiction at the level of the axiomatic base of
the theory. Such contradiction manifests itself as essential divergences in the solutions.
I maintain that the contradiction arises from the continuum approximation adopted to
model the gravitational field through a metric field on a manifold and the attractive char-
acteristic of gravity at small scales, that leads to accumulation points and the consequent
apparition of divergences. This strongly suggest that the continuum approximation fails
to describe space-time at small scales. The field description requires infinite degrees of
freedom, that are not available at certain scales. A short distance cut-off in the degrees
of freedom should prevent the emergence of singular space-times. Discreteness must
be added as an independent assumption to the axioms of the theory when dealing with
very short range phenomena. However, this cannot be done in the framework of classic
General Relativity. Rather, a discrete theory should be developed from which General
Relativity (and the usual notions of space and time) can emerge as some kind of aver-
ages, in similar way to the emergence of thermodynamics from mechanical statistics.
This implies a major ontological shift. Before discussing the ontological implications, I
find convenient to review the continuum approximations of General Relativity.
We have represented the ontological composition of all events by a set E and we have
mentioned that this set has the structure of a differentiable manifold. Let us review the
implications.
9 A background-independent theory lacks any fixed, non-dynamical space-time structure.
Topological spaces
Let E be any set and T = {Eα} a collection, finite or infinite, of subsets of E. Then
(E, T ) is a topological space iff:
1. E ∈ T .
2. /0 ∈ T .
3. Any finite or infinite sub-collection {E1,E2, ...,En} of the Eα is such that ⋃n1 Ei ∈ T .
4. Any finite sub-collection {E1,E2, ...,En} of the Eα is such that ⋂n1 Ei ∈ T .
The set E is called a topological space and the Eα are called open sets. The assignation
of T to E is said to ‘give’ a topology to E.
A function f mapping from the topological space E onto the topological space E ∗ is
continuous if the inverse image of an open set in E∗ is an open set in E.
If a set E has two topologies T 1 = {Eα} and T 2 = {E∗α} such that T 1 ⊃ T 2, we say
that T 1 is stronger than T 2.
Given a topology T on E, then N is a neighborhood of a point e ∈ E if N ⊂ E and
there is some Eα ⊂ N such that e ∈ Eα . Notice that it is not necessary for N to be an
open set. However, all open sets Eα which contain e are neighborhoods of e since they
are contained in themselves. Thus, neighborhoods are more general than open sets.
Let again T be a topology on E. Then any U ⊂ E is closed if the complement of U in
E ( ¯U = E −U ) is an open set. Since ¯¯U = U then a set is open when its complement is
closed. The sets E and /0 are open and closed regardless the topology T .
Given a set U , there will be in general many closed sets that contain U . Let Fα be the
family of closed set that contain U . The closure of U is ˜U =
⋂
α Fα . The closure is the
smallest closed set that contains U . Notice that ˜˜U = ˜U .
The interior U 0 of a set U is the union of all open sets Oα of U : U0 =
⋃
α Oα . The
interior of U is the largest open set of U .
The boundary b(U) of a set U is the complement of the interior of U in the closure of
U : b(U) = ˜U −U0. Closed sets always contain their boundaries:
U ∩b(U) = /0 ⇐⇒U is open.
b(U)⊂U ⇐⇒U is closed.
A subset U is said dense in X if ˜U = X .
Given a family of sets {Fα} = F , F is a cover of U if U ⊂ ⋃α Fα . If
(∀Fα)F(Fα is an open set) then the cover is called an open cover.
A set U is compact if for every open covering {Fα} with U ⊂ ⋃α Fα there always
exist a finite sub-covering {F1, ...,Fn} of U such that ⋃n1 Fα ⊂U .
As an illustration consider the n-dimensional real space ℜn. A subset X of ℜn is
compact iff it is closed and bounded. This means that X must have finite area and volume
in n-dimensions.
A set E is connected if it cannot be written as: E = E1∪E2 where E1 and E2 are both
open sets and E1∩E2 = /0.
Let T1 and T2 be two topological spaces. An homeomorphism is a map f from T1 to
T2:
f : T1 → T2
such that f is continuous and its inverse map f −1 is also continuous. If there is a third
topological space T3 such that T1 is homeomorphic to T2 and T2 is homeomorphic to T3,
then T1 is homeomorphic to T3. An homeomorphism defines an equivalence class, that
of all spaces that homeomorphic to a given topological space. If the homeomorphism f
and its inverse f−1 are infinitely differentiable (C∞), the f is called a diffeomorphism.
All diffeomorphisms are homeomorphisms, but the converse is not always the case.
A topological invariant is a construct that does not change under homeomorphisms.
They are characteristics of the equivalence class of the homeomorphism. An example of
an invariant is the dimension n of ℜn.
Homeomorphisms generate equivalence classes whose members are topological
spaces. Instead, homotopies generate classes whose members are continuous maps.
More specifically, let f1 and f2 be two continuous maps between the topological spaces
T1 and T2:
f1 : T1 → T2,
f2 : T1 → T2.
Then f1 is said to be homotopic to f2 if f1 can be deformed into f2. Formally:
F : T1× [0, 1]→ T2, F continuous
and
F(x, 0) = T1(x),
F(x, 1) = T2(x).
This means that as the real variable t changes continuously from 0 to 1 in the interval
[0, 1] the map f1 is deformed continuously in the map f2. Homotopy is an equivalence
relation that divides the space of continuous maps from T1 to T2 into equivalent classes.
These homotopy equivalent classes are topological invariants of the pair of spaces T1
and T2.
Homotopy can be used to classify topological spaces. If we identify one of the
topological spaces with the n-dimensional sphere Sn, then the space of continuous
maps from Sn to T , C(Sn, T ), can be divided into equivalence classes according to the
topological space T . The equivalent classes of C(Sn, T ) have a group structure and form
the homotopy group Πn(T ).
It is rather straightforward to show that both compactness and connectedness are
topological invariants.
Manifolds: definition and properties
A set E is a differentiable manifold if:
1. E is a topological space.
2. E is equipped with a family of pairs {(Eα , φα)}.
3. The Eα ’s are a family of open sets that cover E: E =
⋃
α Eα . The φα ’s are homeo-
morphisms from Eα to open subsets Oα of ℜn: φα : Eα → Oα .
4. Given Eα and Eβ such that Eα ∩ Eβ = /0, the map φβ ◦ φ−1α from the subset
φα(Eα ∩ Eβ ) of ℜn to the subset φβ (Eα ∩ Eβ ) of ℜn is infinitely differentiable
(C∞).
The family {(Eα , φα)} is called an atlas. The individual members of the atlas are
charts. In informal language we can say that E is a space that can be covered by patches
Eα which are assigned coordinates in ℜn by φα . Within each of these patches E looks
like a subset of the Euclidean space ℜn. E is not necessarily globally Euclidean or
pseudo-Euclidean. If two patches overlap, then in Eα ∩Eβ there are two assignations
of coordinates, which can be transformed smoothly into each other. The dimension of
the manifold E is the dimension n of the space ℜn.
A manifold E is said to be Hausdorff if for any two distinct elements x ∈ E and y ∈ E,
there exist Ox ⊂ E and Oy ⊂ E such that Ox ∩Oy = /0.
A given topological space E is said to be metric if there is a map d : E ×E → ℜ such
that, for any x, y, and z in E:
1. d(x, y)≥ 0.
2. d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y.
3. If z ∈ E, then d(x, y)+d(y, z) = d(x, z).
An important property of manifolds is their orientability. Given a manifold E whose
atlas is {(Eα , φα)}, E is orientable if det(φβ ◦ φ−1α ) > 0 for all Eα and Eβ such that
Eα ∩Eβ = /0. The manifold is orientable if one can define a preferred direction unam-
biguously.
The manifolds adopted in General Relativity to represent space-time have a pseudo-
Riemannian metric and are compact. A very important property is that every metric
space is compact if and only if every subset has at least one accumulation point.
Definition. Let E be a topological space and A a subset of E. A point a ∈ A is called
an accumulation point of A if each neighborhood of a contains infinitely many points of
A.
For compact Hausdorff spaces, every infinite subset A of E has at least one accumu-
lation point in E.
If we want to represent events at very small scale, compactness must be abandoned.
The reason is that any accumulation point implies an infinite energy density, since events
are represented by points of the manifold, events have finite (but not arbitrarily small)
energy, and energy is an additive property. In other words, space-time must be discrete
at the smallest scale.
QUANTUM GRAVITY: A THEORY ABOUT...WHAT?
As far as we can decompose a given event e ∈ E into more basic events, in such a way
that E can be approximated by a compact uncountable (non-denumerable) metric space,
the continuum representation for the totality of events will work. But if there are atomic10
events, there will be a sub-space of E that is countable (or denumerable if it is infinite)
and ontologically basic. There is, in such a case, a discrete substratum underlying the
continuum manifold. Since the quantum of action is given by the Planck constant, it
is a reasonable hypothesis to assume that the atomic events occur at the Planck scale,
lP =
√
h¯G/c3. If there are atomic events, the way they associate would give rise to
composed events (i.e. processes), and then to the continuum space-time, which would
be a large-scale emergent property, absent at the more basic ontological level. This is
similar to, for instance, considering the mind as a collection of complex processes of the
brain, emerging from arrays of ‘mindless’ neurons.
If this view is correct, then quantum gravity is a theory about relations among basic
events and the ontological emergence of space-time and gravity. Quantum gravity would
be a theory so basic that it might well be considered as ontological rather than physical.
The discrete nature of the space-time ontological substratum can be formed by atomic
events. It has been suggested [24] that such events and their relations should be repre-
sented by a partially ordered set (poset). It can be proved that the dimension, topology,
differential structure, and metric of the manifold where a poset is embedded is deter-
mined by the poset structure [25]. If the order relation is interpreted as a causal relation,
the posets are called causal sets (or causets). We do not need to make this distinction at
this level.
A poset is a set P with a partial order binary relation  that is:
• Reflexive: For all x ∈ P, x  x.
• Antisymmetric: For all x, y ∈ P, x  y  x implies x = y.
• Transitive: For all x, y, z ∈ P, x  y  z implies x  z.
• Locally finite: For all x, z ∈ P, card ({y ∈C|x  y  z})< ∞.
Here card (A) denotes the cardinality of the set A. Notice that x ≺ y if x  y and x = y.
The causal relation of a Lorentzian manifold (without closed causal curves) satisfies
the first three conditions. It is the local finiteness condition that introduces space-time
discreteness. A given poset can be embedded into a Lorentzian manifold. An embedding
is a map taking elements of the poset into points in the manifold such that the order
relation of the poset matches the causal ordering of the manifold. A further criterion is
needed however before the embedding is suitable. If, on average, the number of causal
set elements mapped into a region of the manifold is proportional to the volume of the
region, the embedding is said to be faithful. The poset is then called manifold-like
A conjecture (called hauptvermutung) must be made to ensure that the same poset
cannot be faithfully embedded into two space-times that are not similar on large scales.
10 I use the word ‘atomic’ in the original Greek sense of α´τoμoς , “uncut”, “individual”, “not decompos-
able”.
Alternatively, a poset can be generated by sprinkling points (events) from a Lorentzian
manifold. By sprinkling points in proportion to the volume of the space-time regions
and using the causal order relations in the manifold to induce order relations between
the sprinkled points, a poset can be produced that (by construction) can be faithfully
embedded into the manifold.
To maintain Lorentz invariance this sprinkling of points must be done randomly using
a Poisson process. Thus, the probability of sprinkling n points (events) into a region of
volume V is:
P(n) =
(ρV )ne−ρV
n! , (22)
where ρ is the density of the sprinkling.
A link in a poset is a pair of elements x, y ∈ P such that x ≺ y but with no z ∈ P such
that x ≺ z ≺ y. In other words, x and y represent directly linked events.
A chain is a sequence of elements x0, x1, . . . ,xn such that xi ≺ xi+1 for i = 0, . . . ,n−1.
The length of a chain is n, the number of relations used. A chain represents a process.
A geodesic between two poset elements can then be introduced as follows: a geodesic
between two elements x, y ∈ P is a chain consisting only of links such that x0 = x and
xn = y. The length of the chain, n, is maximal over all chains from x to y. In general
there will be more than one geodesic between two elements. The length of a geodesic
should be directly proportional to the proper time along a timelike geodesic joining the
two space-time points if the embedding is faithful.
A major challenge is to recover a realistic space-time structure starting from a nu-
merable poset. This problem is sometimes called “dynamics of causets”. A step in the
direction of solving the problem is a classical model in which elements are added accord-
ing to probabilities. This model is known as classical sequential growth (CSG) dynamics
[26]. The classical sequential growth model is a way to generate causal sets by adding
new elements one after another (see Figure 1). Rules for how new elements are added
are specified and, depending on the parameters in the model, different causal sets result.
The direction of growing gives rise to time, which does not exist at the fundamental
poset event level.
Another challenge is to account for the remaining referents of General Relativity,
namely, gravitating objects. I suggest that physical objects can be understood as clusters
of processes, and hence can emerge as inhomogeneities in the growing pattern of events.
This conjecture is supported by the observation that whatever exists seems to have
energy, and energy is just the capability to change. The most populous the bundle of
events, the larger the associated energy. In this view, energy emerges as well, just as a
measure of the density of basic events. Objects, physical things, would be nothing else
than clusters of events.
The ontology of Quantum Gravity, and of the world, under this perspective, would
be a maelstrom of basic events; the things, people, galaxies of the universe, arise as a
patterned poset in that storm.
The poset of finite causal sets
q 3
q = 1
0
2
2
3
3
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
3
3
3
2
1
2
q
4
2
2
2
2
3
.
FIGURE 1. Poset generation by classical sequential growth (from Ref. [27])
CONCLUSIONS
General Relativity is a theory about the gravitational field and the physical systems
that interact with it, i.e. all physical systems. General Relativity is not a theory about
space-time. Space-time is an ontological emergent property of the system formed by all
existents, whatever they are. Because of the unique universality of gravity, models of
space-time can be used to represent the gravitational field in General Relativity. More
precisely, the affine connection of space-time represents the strength of the field, and the
metric represents the gravitational potential.
Space-time emerges from events and processes. Processes are nothing else than chains
of events. The most basic events, at the Planck scale, can be supposed to form a
numerable set with a partial order, a poset. These posets represent the basic substratum
of reality. The space-time continuum emerges from the basic discrete events. From a
formal point of view, the manifold model of General Relativity should be recovered
from an adequate large number limit of a discrete set theory endowed with a partial
order structure. Time, as well as the spatial dimensions, should emerge in the process
as well, along with the topological and metric properties we attribute to space-time.
Bridging this breach between the discrete and the continuum, between the basic and the
complex, between atomic events and our daily reality, is perhaps the greatest scientific
enterprise of our time.
APPENDIX: AXIOMATIC GENERAL RELATIVITY
In this Appendix we provide an axiomatic formulation of General Relativity. Previous
axiomatizations have been presented by Bunge [8] and Covarrubias [28].
The formal background of the theory is formed by first order logic, set theory, topol-
ogy, and differential geometry. The physical background consists of general system the-
ory and Special Relativity. The ontological background is space-time theory, as sketched
above.
The primitive base of basic concepts that appear in the axiomatic base is given by:
〈
Mn, {g} , Σ, ¯Σ, {T} , K, Λ, κ〉 .
Here, Mn is a n-dimensional real differential manifold, {g} is a family of pseudo-
Riemannian metric fields on Mn, Σ is the collection of gravitational fields, ¯Σ is the
collections of physical entities other than gravitational fields, {T} is a family of 2-
covariant tensor fields functionals of g and possibly of state variables, K is the collection
of all possible reference systems, Λ is a constant, and κ is a negative real dimensional
number.
The full meaning of these symbols is established through the following axiom system.
• A.1 Σ is a nonempty collection such that every σ ∈ Σ designates a gravitational
field.
• A.2 ¯Σ is a nonempty collection such that every σ¯ ∈ ¯Σ designates macroscopic
physical system other than a gravitational field. This collection includes a null
(fictional) individual that represents the absence of material systems other than
gravitational fields.
• A.3 The pseudo-Riemannian C∞ metric manifold (Mn, g), with n = 4 represents
space-time.
• A.4 K = /0 ∧ K ⊂ ¯Σ.
• A.5 Every k ∈ K is a possible physical reference frame. For every such frame a
specific coordinate assignation can be defined.
• A.6 Each T ∈ {T} is a symmetric 2-covariant tensor field, functional of g and
possibly of state variables over M4.
• A.7 (∀σ¯)
¯Σ (∃T){T} (T represents the energy, momentum, and stress of σ¯).
• A.8 (∀σ)Σ (∃g)g (∃σ¯) ¯Σ (G−Λg = κT), where G is the Einstein tensor formed by
second derivatives of g and T is the energy-momentum tensor field corresponding
to σ¯ .
• A.9 Λ is a constant that represents the energy density of space-time in the absence of
non-gravitational fields. The constant κ represents the coupling of the gravitational
field with the non-gravitational systems.
• A.10 k = −8πGc−4, with G the gravitational constant and c the speed of light in
vacuum.
From these 10 axioms is possible to deduce all the standard theorems of General
Relativity [28]. Some clarifications are relevant.
The macroscopic physical systems are partitioned into gravitational and non-
gravitational. All systems generate gravitational fields; hence the field equations are
non-linear. Since gravitational fields can exist in absence of sources, the null individual
(a fiction) is included in ¯Σ.
Physical systems are grouped in collections, not sets, since they can appear and
disappear (i.e. the number of elements in a collection can change, contrary to what
happens with set members). The tensor fields that represent physical entities are then
grouped in collections as well.
The existence of free gravitational fields implies that the dimensionality of space-time
should be 4 o larger. This can be established as a theorem. We have fixed n = 4 since we
are axiomatizing standard General Relativity.
From the axioms is clear that General Relativity is about the members of both Σ and
¯Σ. The theory is not about space-time. The whole ontological theory of space-time, as
outlined above, is presupposed by General Relativity. The axioms that link mathematical
constructs such as g and T with referents of the theory are of semantic nature. Once the
interpretation is fixed in this way, axiom A.8 expresses a law of nature. Such a law can
be derived from meta-laws, such as the Action Principle, given the right Lagrangian.
Finally, I remark that General Relativity makes no assumption on the nature of the
elements of ¯Σ and how to represent their energy and momentum, beyond the weak
hypothesis that this representation should came in the form of a second rank tensor
field of C1 class (this can be proved as theorem). The exact form of this field is left to
our inferences from the world.
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